IPHR, KIBHR
14.07.2025. This report covers developments affecting freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly in Kazakhstan from November 2024 to June 2025. It was prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor. The US presidential administration’s moves to dismantle USAID and overhaul US foreign assistance fuelled renewed attacks on foreign-funded NGOs in Kazakhstan. Decision makers – from MPs to the president – accused such groups of using foreign grants to promote ‘’alien’’ values and undermine Kazakhstan’s image. New restrictive legislative measures were also proposed as part of what appeared to be a coordinated campaign. In particular, in February 2025, an MP called for a “foreign agent” NGO law, citing the Trump administration’s actions as justification to “rewrite the rules of the game”. Her parliamentary faction, a pro-government party, began drafting such a law. Separately, the Ministry of Culture and Information initiated work on a general NGO law, with a working group tasked to prepare a draft by August 2025. These developments raised serious concerns that new stringent provisions specifically targeting foreign-funded NGOs may be introduced, on top of existing legislation that already subjects such groups to discriminatory reporting requirements and stigmatising listing in a public registry. Organisations advocating for so-called non-traditional values, such as gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights were singled out for particular criticism and faced renewed harassment. While the feminist and LGBTQI+ organisation Feminita’s registration applications have been repeatedly rejected, its co-founders, Gulzada Serzhan and Zhanar Sekerbayeva, were fined in February 2025 for leading an unregistered organisation. That same month, anti-feminist activists twice attacked an event the organisation held in Almaty, with police failing to take adequate action to protect participants. In another worrying development, in May 2025, the Kazakhstani Ombudsperson publicly attacked the NGO Coalition against Torture — led by KIBHR — because of information submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in response to a request for input. The official dismissed the Coalition’s findings as “biased” and ‘’distorted’’ and erroneously claimed that the EU ‘’was paying’’ for the UN submission. His statement triggered a broader online smear campaign against the Coalition and its members. Concerns persisted about impunity for law enforcement abuses during the suppression of the January 2022 mass protests. While 40–50 officials have been convicted of torture and other abuses, this is low number given the scale of violations. In addition, proceedings have often been marred by fair trial concerns, lenient penalties and inadequate compensation for victims. For example, in January 2025, six officials convicted of torturing dozens of detainees received only three-year prison sentences, and only some victims’ requests for compensation were granted. The verdict was upheld unchanged on appeal in June 2025. In January 2025, the Constitutional Court issued an important ruling in support of freedom of assembly, holding that local authorities cannot automatically deny permission for protests simply because other events are planned at the proposed sites. Instead, they must offer suitable alternatives. In some cases, local courts also faulted authorities for rejecting requests to hold peaceful assemblies without valid reasons. However, despite this, officials continued to reject requests to hold peaceful protests on dubious grounds. For example, ahead of International Women’s Day in March 2025, women’s rights activists in Almaty were denied permission to hold marches, and peaceful assemblies planned to mark the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repression and Famine in May 2025 were banned in ten cities across the country. At the same time, authorities continued to detain and penalise people taking part in occasional peaceful protests held without official sanction. Those targeted included protesters who called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to “get the hell out of Kazakhstan!” during an official visit, showed support for an arrested blogger with signs reading “Satire is not a crime,” and demanded action on unemployment and rising prices. In one case, over ten people were fined for gathering in a private apartment to record a video appeal to the president, lamenting what they considered to be unlawful court decisions. Preventive detentions of activists ahead of planned or potential protests also remained a persistent practice, with such detentions documented, for example, ahead of International Women’s Day and the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repression and Famine. Overall, the authorities’ repressive actions have significantly curtailed the space for exercising the right to peaceful assembly. Independent media, journalists, bloggers, activists, and government critics also faced ongoing pressure, ranging from online attacks to legal prosecution – often on vague charges like spreading ‘’false’’ information or inciting discord. The case of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Kazakh service, Radio Azattyq, illustrates the excessively broad application of “false” information charges. In November 2024, the service was fined for allegedly spreading such information due to an unintentional translation error, despite offering to correct it. This was the second time it was fined under an administrative provision introduced in 2023 to penalise the spread of “false” information, alongside a pre-existing criminal code article. Both provisions have repeatedly been used to stifle legitimate free speech. In a case that attracted wide attention, blogger Temirlan Yensebek was arrested in January 2025 and charged with inciting discord for sharing a controversial but widely available song on his satirical Instagram channel. In April 2025, he was sentenced to five years of restricted freedom and prohibited from publishing on social media, speaking to journalists, or taking part in public activities. Human rights defenders believe the song was used as a pretext to punish him for his satirical posts critical of Kazakhstani and Russian public figures. Concerns persisted over imprisoned opposition activists, including Alga Kazakhstan! party leader Marat Zhylanbaev and journalist-blogger-activist Duman Mukhamedkarim, both convicted on dubious extremism-related charges. Zhylanbaev held a 40-day hunger strike in spring 2025 to protest against degrading detention conditions and being denied the right to work, draw and run — which is especially important to him as a former world-renowned marathon runner. This was his eighth hunger strike since his imprisonment in 2023. After Mukhamedkarim’s sentence was upheld on appeal in November 2024, he reportedly injured himself and launched a hunger strike in protest over being denied transfer to a prison in his home Almaty region, as stipulated by law. He was instead transferred to a prison about 1,000 kilometres from Almaty region. In other cases deemed politically motivated, investigations were under way. Five activists, who were charged with preparing mass riots in September 2024 after opposing Kazakhstan’s planned nuclear power plant, remained in pre-trial detention. They were recognised as political prisoners by human rights defenders and included on a list of such prisoners, which grew to 31 in spring 2025. The trial in their case is expected to start in July 2025. Well-known independent journalist Lukpan Akhmedyarov was detained for questioning in April 2025 for allegedly spreading “false” information after reporting on Kazakh citizens coerced into fighting for Russia in Ukraine. Later, he reported receiving a new summons from police over his reporting on the same issue, reinforcing concerns about renewed reprisals for his journalistic activities. Kazakhstani authorities also continued to pursue critics abroad, as shown by the detention of women’s rights activist Dinara Smailova in Montenegro in April 2025 on an extradition request from Kazakhstan. Although she was released the next day, the extradition request remained under consideration, along with her request for asylum in Montenegro. Having fled Kazakhstan in 2021, Smailova is facing multiple criminal charges in absentia, which are widely seen as retaliation for her work exposing domestic and sexual violence and assisting victims. Her organisation’s accounts have been frozen, severely obstructing its ability to operate. In June 2025, Smailova reported suspicious surveillance, reinforcing concerns about her safety. Meanwhile, there was no meaningful progress in ensuring accountability for the July 2024 killing of opposition journalist Aidos Sadykov in Kyiv. Kazakhstani authorities have refused to cooperate with the investigation by Ukrainian prosecutors, who have identified two Kazakhstani citizens as the suspected perpetrators. One suspect was initially detained in Kazakhstan but was reportedly later released under a travel ban, while no active steps appear to have been taken to locate the second. Sadykov, who ran a YouTube channel critical of the government together with his wife, had faced years of harassment and charges in absentia after fleeing Kazakhstan. These developments are described in more detail below.
Association Foreign-funded NGOs targeted
The US presidential administration’s moves to dismantle USAID and overhaul US foreign assistance in early 2025 prompted new attacks in Kazakhstan against foreign-funded NGOs, with policymakers intensifying hostile rhetoric and accusing such groups of promoting interests alien to the country. In addition, several proposals for new restrictive measures targeting NGOs were put forward in what appeared to be a coordinated campaign. On 5th February 2025, MP Magerram Magerramov called on the government to conduct a thorough review of foreign-funded projects in the country, citing a White House press release that accused USAID of supporting “malicious” projects. He specifically lashed out against projects promoting LGBTQI+ rights, claiming they promote “an ideology alien to us, imposed under the guise of human rights.” He also called for legislation to protect children from “malicious” foreign-funded projects. It is not clear whether the government took any action directly in response to this request. However, when responding to an inquiry from a group of deputies in March 2025, Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin stated that the authorities intended to conduct a detailed analysis of USAID’s activities in Kazakhstan and its connections with local organisations, with a particular focus on identifying “possible cover-up schemes, discrepancies in the use of funds, and conflicts of interest”. In February 2025, MP Irina Smirnova proposed introducing a ‘’foreign agent’’ NGO law in the country. With direct reference to the Trump administration’s actions on foreign assistance, she argued that it is time to reassess the status of NGOs and ‘’rewrite the rules of the game with foreign donors who disguise political interests as ‘media support,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘increasing tolerance’’. The following month, it was reported that her parliamentary faction – the People’s Party of Kazakhstan – had begun drafting such a law. At the time of writing, there was no further information about its status. In parallel, a separate general draft law on NGOs was initiated. The Ministry of Culture and Information is in charge of developing such a law, with a working group composed of close to 40 representatives of the Ministry, MPs, experts, lawyers, and leaders of public associations established to prepare a consultative document and submit it to the Interdepartmental Commission on Legislative Activities under the Ministry of Justice by 1st August 2025. These developments have raised serious concerns that new restrictive legislative provisions might be introduced, targeting especially NGOs that receive foreign funding. Such organisations are already subject to a discriminatory reporting scheme and listed on a stigmatising public registry. President Tokayev also weighed in on the heightened discussion about foreign-funded projects, which was prompted by the shift in US foreign policy. In a public address delivered on 14th March 2025, he accused international NGOs of interfering in domestic affairs, promoting “alien” values, and allegedly misusing funds. “For decades, many countries have had so-called democratic moral values, including LGBTQI+, imposed upon them, and under this banner, international non-governmental foundations and organisations have blatantly interfered in their internal affairs. In reality, it all turned out to be quite simple — billion-dollar budgets were being embezzled”, Tokayev stated, without providing examples to back up his words. These accusations – made with reference to the current US administration’s stated aim of tackling financial abuses and restoring “traditional” values – also cast suspicion on local groups which cooperate with international partners. In a later public address delivered on 24th April 2025, Tokayev renewed his allegations, accusing ‘’certain supposedly human rights organisations’’, bloggers and journalists of using foreign funding to promote a negative image of Kazakhstan and to stage ‘’provocations’’. He claimed that recent revelations about the activities of foreign organisations “have shown their cynicism, greed, and indifference toward Kazakhstan, while also exposing the dark sides of some well-known Kazakhstani grant recipients.” He also accused Kazakhstani activists living abroad of conducting ‘’paid attacks on our people, even attempting to blackmail our state institutions.”
Harassment of feminist LGBTQI+ group
The feminist LGBTQI+ movement Feminita faced renewed harassment during the reporting period. As covered in the previous update, in October 2024, a meeting organised by Feminita in Almaty was disrupted by members of the Kazakhstan Parents’ Union, who filmed participants without consent. When the police arrived, they detained Feminita’s leader instead of protecting the group. The same day, a ruling party MP publicly called for Feminita to be declared “extremist” and banned. This reinforced stigmatisation of the group, although his request was not pursued by the authorities. In February 2025, Feminita again faced interference while organising a two-day event for women activists at a hotel in Almaty, focused on countering gender inequality and violence and providing training on documenting and reporting violations. On both days, participants were attacked by anti-feminist activists defending so-called traditional values. On 13th February, members of the Kazakhstan Parents’ Union — including its chair, Bagila Baltabayeva — stormed into the venue, disrupted the event, and accused participants of ‘’violating the law’’. They called the police, who detained Feminita’s co-founders, Gulzada Serzhan and Zhanar Sekerbayeva, for several hours. Both were later fined about 800 EUR for leading an unregistered organisation (under Article 489 of the Administrative Code). Feminita’s registration applications have repeatedly been rejected on spurious grounds. On 14th February, another group led by Bibinur Sheraliyeva of the public foundation “Rakhym” and Dilnar Insenova — a former opposition activist now supporting the government — forced their way into the venue, turned on loud music and shouted things like ‘’Foreign agents go away!’’, effectively ending the event. Although police were called, no action was taken against the intruders, despite complaints by the organisers and hotel administration. In further acts of harassment, shortly before International Women’s Day in March 2025, Zhanar Sekerbayeva and another Feminita activist, Aktorgyn Akkenzhebalasy, were each sentenced to 10 days’ detention over their participation in a peaceful protest the previous year (see more under Peaceful Assembly).
Smear campaign against the NGO Coalition against Torture
In May 2025, the Kazakhstani Ombudsperson publicly attacked the NGO Coalition against Torture, led by KIBHR, after it submitted information to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture — a standard practice for civil society. In a public statement, the Ombudsperson dismissed the Coalition’s findings as “biased”, ‘’tendentious’’ and “non-credible” and accused it of “distorting reality,” “manipulating public opinion,” and lacking interest in dialogue and partnership. He also took aim at the Coalition’s international ties, erroneously linking the UN submission to EU funding and expressing regret that “the EU is paying for all this.” These remarks helped trigger a broader wave of online backlash against the Coalition and its members, which caused significant concern, although it eventually subsided. In a joint written statement, members of the Coalition and their Kazakhstani civil society partners expressed regret about the Ombudsperson’s accusations. They stressed that the submission was part of regular cooperation with UN mechanisms, independent of any donor funding, and based on verified data gathered through long-standing monitoring and documentation. They also emphasised that the Coalition has consistently acknowledged not only concerns but also progress in the fight against torture, noting, however, that while some positive steps have been taken, serious problems persist. They urged the Ombudsperson to engage in respectful and constructive dialogue with civil society and to act in line with established practices of interaction with international mechanisms. IPHR and the World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) – both of whom co-submitted the information to the UN Special Rapporteur with the Coalition – expressed alarm at the attack, saying that targeting organisations for cooperating with UN mechanisms as part of efforts to combat torture and ill-treatment is unacceptable. They called on the authorities to stop stigmatising civil society, protect it from reprisals, and uphold Kazakhstan’s obligations to ensure unhindered cooperation with international human rights bodies.
Assembly
Fallout from the “Bloody January” protests
According to official information, some 40-50 security and law enforcement officials have been convicted of torture and other abuses committed during the ‘’Bloody’’ January 2022 events, when authorities harshly suppressed mass protests and ensuing unrest and detained thousands of protestors across the country. However, while this is welcome, the number remains low compared to the scale of violations. In addition, proceedings have often been marred by fair trial concerns, lenient penalties and inadequate compensation for victims. For example, in January 2025, a local court convicted six police officers in a case where about 100 people were detained on the Almaty-Bishkek highway and brutally tortured in a detention centre in Almaty region during the January events. These officers all received three-year prison sentences – which is lenient given the scale and nature of the abuses they committed. In addition, only some victims’ requests for compensation were granted. Human rights lawyer Aina Shormanbaeyva, who represented some of the victims in the case, also expressed concerns about due process and fair trial violations, stating that the trial began before all circumstances had been clarified, all perpetrators had been identified, and all those subjected to torture had been recognised as victims. In June 2025, the verdict in the case was upheld without change. The victims in the case include citizens of both Kazakhstan and neighbouring countries. Among them is Vikram Ruzakhunov, a well-known jazz musician from Kyrgyzstan who was detained during the January 2022 events, although he did not take part in the protests. His case attracted widespread attention when a video was shown on Kazakhstani state TV on 9th January 2022, in which he appeared with apparent traces of beatings and purportedly confessed to having been recruited to take part in the unrest in exchange for 200 USD. When his supporters recognised him, a public outcry followed, resulting in Ruzakhunov’s release and return to Kyrgyzstan. Ruzakhunov called the verdict “only a small step towards justice” and noted that the trial took place in an intimidating atmosphere, with dozens of police officers gathering outside the court building to express their support for the officers on trial.
Constitutional court ruling supports the right to freedom of assembly, but rejections and lack of transparency persist
In a welcome decision issued on 20th January 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of a complaint filed by human rights defenders (including a lawyer from KIBHR), stating that authorities must not automatically deny permission for peaceful assemblies – such as on the grounds that other events are already planned at the proposed venues. Instead, authorities must suggest an alternative time or venue of equivalent suitability. Only if organisers reject these proposals can permission be denied. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling, authorities continued to reject requests to hold peaceful assemblies on unsubstantiated grounds. For example, ahead of International Women’s Day on 8th March 2025, authorities in Almaty rejected a series of requests by women’s rights activists to hold peaceful assemblies on this day, claiming such gatherings could pose a threat to public order. In another example, civil society activists were denied permission to hold peaceful assemblies on 31st May 2025 — the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repressions and Famine – in ten cities across Kazakhstan. Local authorities mostly cited reasons such as alleged venue unavailability, construction work, or incomplete applications. In some cases, local courts faulted authorities for rejecting requests to hold peaceful assemblies. In particular, in March 2025, courts in Ust-Kamenogorsk and Uralsk ruled that local authorities had unlawfully refused permission for assemblies on social and environmental issues. In Ust-Kamenogorsk, three activists successfully challenged multiple refusals to hold protests against the introduction of a unified time zone, but ultimately cancelled the approved march themselves due to unexpectedly high interest and security concerns. In Uralsk, a regional court overturned the city administration’s repeated denials of a rally calling for the abolition of the vehicle recycling fee and simpler car registration, and issued a warning to prevent future violations — but the protest did not take place because the organisers were unable to travel to Uralsk at the time. The lack of transparency by authorities regarding the number of approved versus rejected assembly requests remained another serious concern. Since April 2024, the Astana Akimat (city administration) has published a monthly list of supposedly authorised gatherings. These lists suggest that the city’s four designated assembly sites are fully booked at the start of each month, effectively preventing new requests. Notably, the number of listed actions remains constant each month, varying only with the number of days in the month. The Akimat has refused to disclose the themes of these gatherings, citing “non-disclosure of personal data.” It has also failed to respond to requests for clarification from the KIBHR, redirecting its inquiries to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—an institution not responsible for processing assembly requests. Moreover, the official figures provided by the Akimat are not corroborated by monitoring conducted by human rights defenders or by reports in the media or on social media.
Ongoing violations of peaceful assembly
While the number of peaceful assemblies held in Kazakhstan has significantly declined due to the authorities’ repressive actions — including the arbitrary rejection of permission — protests still occasionally took place during the reporting period. At the same time, authorities continued to target participants in unsanctioned protests, detaining and penalising them. Preventive detentions of activists ahead of planned or potential protests also remained a persistent practice. This ongoing clampdown further curtailed the already limited space for exercising the right to peaceful assembly.
Below we provide a few examples of violations of the right to peaceful assembly during the reporting period. In the following cases, protesters were penalised for actions critical of the Russian government’s policies: On 27th November 2024, three Kokshetau residents — Marat Zhanuzakov, Baurzhan Baltashev, and Walikhan Negmetov — were each fined about 150 EUR for peacefully protesting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan for a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). They carried Kazakh and Ukrainian flags and a sign condemning the Russian President’s visit with an expletive (‘’poshyol na khren’’) that roughly translates to, “Your Excellency, get the hell out of Kazakhstan!” The court found them guilty of a minor public order disturbance, citing the sign’s wording as offensive.
On 24th February 2025, an Almaty court fined Russian citizen Timofey Morozov about 370 EUR for violating the Law on Peaceful Assemblies as a foreigner. Morozov, who has lived in Kazakhstan since 2024, staged a solo picket on Republic Square in Almaty with a sign reading: “Ukraine will win, Russia will be free.” Supporters of a satirical blogger, who was prosecuted on criminal charges considered retaliatory, were repeatedly targeted: Following the January 2025 detention of satirical blogger Temirlan Yensebek (see more on his case under Expression), activists peacefully protesting in his support faced penalties. Several activists were sentenced to fines or 15 days’ detention for staging one-person pickets holding messages such as “Satire is not a crime.” They were accused of violating assembly rules for failing to obtain prior permission. Later, on 10th April 2025, five civil society activists were detained and taken to the police in connection with a court hearing in Yensebek’s case. After being denied entry to the courtroom, they began chanting “Open court!” in the foyer and were removed by police. Four of them were fined for “hooliganism”, each receiving a penalty of about 150 EUR. The fifth activist, Aktorgyn Akkenzhebalasy – among those previously fined for picketing in solidarity with Yensebek – was released after feeling unwell and requiring an ambulance. In the following cases, protesters were penalised when raising concerns about socio-economic concerns without pre-approval: An Almaty court sentenced Nauryzbek Batyrkhanov and Malik Kaiynbayev to 15 days’ detention for participating in an unauthorised rally near the city’s central mosque on 16th February 2025. The protest, which was attended by around a dozen people, called for solutions to unemployment, price controls, higher wages, and for better social benefits. Police detained Batyrkhanov, who had travelled from Atyrau for medical treatment, and Kaiynbayev, from Aktobe, while they were at the mosque.
On 20th May 2025, three migrant construction workers staged a protest at a residential building site in Kostanau by hoisting banners from the 9th floor demanding unpaid wages. After receiving a package of money, they ended the protest but were sentenced the next day to one day of administrative detention for allegedly violating the law on peaceful assemblies. These examples illustrate the practice of “preventive” detentions of activists, as well as the use of earlier unsanctioned assemblies as a pretext to imprison them in this context: Ahead of Kazakhstan’s Independence Day on 16th December 2024, police in several regions detained politically active citizens to prevent public commemorations. At least five people were sentenced to 5–20 days of administrative detention on charges of allegedly violating peaceful assembly rules, failing to comply with the lawful orders of authorities, and petty hooliganism. The activists rejected the accusations, saying they were targeted for political reasons. On 28th February 2025, police detained Feminita co-founder Zhanar Sekerbayeva in Almaty and brought her to court the same day, where she was sentenced to 10 days’ detention for participating in a peaceful, unauthorised protest in May 2024. A few days later, on 3rd March 2025, another Feminita activist, Aktorgyn Akkenzhebalasy, was handed a similar sentence for the same May 2024 protest, which was held to demand an adequate penalty for a former government minister who had brutally murdered his wife. Two other participants were fined shortly after the protest. The fact that Sekerbayeva’s and Akkenzhebalasy’s detention came many months later indicates that the authorities used these penalties to deter protests on International Women’s Day on 8th March 2025 (see also above regarding rejected requests to hold assemblies on this day). Akkenzhebalasy had previously been fined for protesting in solidarity with blogger Temirlan Yensebek (see above). On the eve of the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repressions and Famine on 31st May 2025, around a dozen activists across the country faced administrative penalties — either for alleged participation in previous unauthorised assemblies or on other dubious grounds. Combined with the widespread rejections of requests to hold assemblies (see above), these penalties were clearly aimed at preventing protests on this day. In this case, citizens were penalised for recording a video message to the president in a private home: On 21st April 2025, a group of citizens gathered in a private apartment in Astana to record a video appeal to President Tokayev, raising concerns about court decisions they believed to be unlawful. The apartment belonged to Sanavar Zakirova, a public figure who was not present at the time — she had merely allowed them to use the space. However, the Astana Police Department later claimed that Zakirova’s apartment was the “office” of an unregistered political party, Our Right, an initiative she had abandoned several years ago due to pressure. On this basis, the police accused Zakirova of leading an unregistered association, with legal proceedings still pending at the time of writing. In addition, more than 10 people who appeared in the video were charged with allegedly participating in an unregistered association or holding an unsanctioned assembly, despite their assurances that they were not involved in Our Right and were simply exercising their right to freedom of expression by recording the appeal to the president. Those convicted were fined an average of 400 EUR.
Expression
During the reporting period, the country’s few remaining independent media outlets, and journalists, bloggers, civil society activists, opposition supporters and others critical of the authorities continued to be subjected to pressure. This pressure ranged from online attacks to legal prosecution. Those prosecuted and convicted often face broadly worded charges such as spreading false information, defamation, and incitement of discord. A list of political prisoners compiled by an expert council of well-known Kazakhstani human rights defenders was expanded to include a total of 31 individuals believed to have been detained in retaliation for exercising their freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. Eight people were added in April 2025. Below we highlight a few cases of particular concern.
Satirical blogger prosecuted
Temirlan Yensebek, a blogger running the satirical Instagram channel Qaznews24, was detained on 17th January 2025 following a search of his Almaty home. He was charged with inciting inter-ethnic discord because of a post published a year earlier, which featured a song containing offensive lyrics about Russians. Yensebek’s post was a reaction to claims made by a pro-government media personality in Russia that the Russian language is being pushed out in Kazakhstan. As highlighted in an IPHR statement, it is of serious concern that Yensebek was prosecuted merely for sharing the controversial song, which he did not write, and which has been widely shared on social media – particularly following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when it regained popularity, although originally released much earlier. On 11th April 2025, a local court in Almaty sentenced Yensebek to five years of restricted freedom — a non-custodial sentence — and imposed wide-ranging restrictions on his fundamental freedoms, prohibiting him from publishing on social media, speaking to journalists, and taking part in public activities. KIBHR concluded that the circumstances of the case showed Yensebek was penalised for his satirical blog posts critical of public figures, with the song used as a pretext for charges under the overly broad criminal code provision on inciting discord. The organisation called on the authorities to review the case in line with Kazakhstan’s international obligations. On 27th May 2025, Almaty City Court upheld the blogger’s sentence but clarified that the restrictions on public engagement apply only for the duration of the restricted freedom sentence — a point the lower court had failed to specify.
Imprisoned opposition activists protesting their treatment
The leader of the unregistered Alga Kazakhstan! party, Marat Zhylanbaev, continued to serve a seven-year prison sentence on unsubstantiated extremism-related charges, issued in 2023 in retaliation for his peaceful opposition activities. He has reported being subjected to pressure in prison and has repeatedly launched hunger strikes to protest against inhuman and degrading treatment. In April 2025, he went on hunger strike for the eighth time to protest against being held in degrading detention conditions and denied the right to work, draw and run — which is especially important to him as a former world-renowned marathon runner. He ended his hunger strike only after 40 days. According to his wife, he has also been held in solitary confinement for allegedly violating prison rules, and subjected to other unjustified restrictions such as being denied access to medicine, bed linen and newspapers. He is serving his sentence in a prison in Stepnogorsk in Akmola region. As covered in our previous update, journalist, blogger, and activist Duman Mukhamedkarim was similarly handed a seven-year prison sentence on spurious extremism-related charges following a closed trial in August 2024. While Mukhamedkarim reported being subjected to ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, an investigation into these allegations did not produce any concrete results. After his conviction was upheld on appeal in November 2024, Mukhamedkarim reportedly cut himself on his arms, stomach, and throat and launched a hunger strike in protest at being denied transfer from the pre-trial detention facility in Taldykorgan, Jetisu region, to a prison in his home Almaty region where his parents live. By law, prisoners should serve their sentences in the regions where their relatives live. However, this requirement was ignored in Mukhamedkarim’s case and he was eventually transferred to a prison in Kyzylorda region, about 1,000 kilometres from Almaty region. According to Mukhamedkarim’s lawyer, prior to his transfer, his client was placed in solitary confinement to penalise him for standing up for his rights. Human rights defenders have recognised Mukhamedkarim as a political prisoner and called for his release.
Nuclear power plan related case
As covered in our previous update, a group of activists opposing the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Kazakhstan were detained in September 2024 on charges of allegedly preparing mass riots. Five of them were placed in pre-trial detention, while the rest were released with a travel ban. Fellow activists believe that the case is related to their peaceful engagement against the NPP. According to the police, an expert assessment in the case concluded that the activists called for a protest, collected funds to organise it, and allegedly urged people to fight against the authorities. In April 2025, the five activists in pre-trial detention in the case were recognised as political prisoners by the Kazakhstani expert council of human rights defenders. They include: Aidar Mubarakov, Nurlan Zhauylbaev, Fazylzhan Sydykov, Nurlan Temirgaliev, and Zhanat Kazakhbai. At the time of writing, they remained in detention. The trial was set to start in late June 2025, but the first hearing was postponed without explanation. It was later rescheduled for 10th July 2025.
Journalist targeted over reporting on Ukraine war
On 10 April 2025, Lukpan Akhmedyarov, a well-known journalist from Uralsk and editor of the independent Uralskaya Gazeta, was detained and taken in for police questioning in criminal case on knowingly spreading ‘’false’’ information. Shortly before his detention, Akhmedyarov published a video on his project Just Journalism, reporting on Kazakh citizens who had gone to work in Russia and were coerced into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence to fight in the war against Ukraine. A woman who had sought the journalist’s help to publicize the case of her brother, who ended up fighting in Ukraine, later told Akhmedyarov that police had pressured her into filing a complaint against him. This development gave rise to concerns, although there have been no further investigative actions since April. Later, however, Akhmedyarov reported being summoned by police again because of a new complaint allegedly filed by a local resident in relation to his reporting on Kazakh citizens fighting in Ukraine.
Conviction for anti-corruption call
Not only well-known activists, journalists and bloggers are targeted for prosecution under broadly worded criminal code provisions, but also ordinary citizens exercising their freedom of expression. For example, on 5th November 2024, Jadyra Dosekeeva, a resident of Zhanaozen, was sentenced to three years of restricted freedom – a non-custodial sentence – because of a social message in which she called for the country to rid itself of corrupt officials. Her statement appears to have been deliberately distorted by a government-appointed linguistic expert, who omitted the word ‘’corrupt’’ in his assessment and deemed her words as incitement to hatred and a call to overthrow the government. Despite her lawyer’s requests for an independent review, the court relied on this questionable expertise. As a result, Dosekeeva was penalised for peacefully expressing her opinion.
Women’s rights activist detained based on extradition request
Kazakhstani authorities also engage in transnational repression, targeting inconvenient individuals based abroad. In one such case, on 14th April 2025, women’s rights activist Dinara Smailova (also known as Dina Tansari) – who fled Kazakhstan in 2021 – was detained in Montenegro based on an extradition request from Kazakhstani authorities. She was eventually released the following day pending further consideration of her case. The trial began in June 2025. Her request for asylum in Montenegro is also under review. As covered before, Kazakhstani authorities have brought multiple criminal charges against Smailova in absentia in relation to her work to assist victims of domestic and sexual violence and ensure accountability for perpetrators. She has been accused of using money donated to her organisation, Ne Molchi, for personal needs, disseminating ‘’false’’ information on social media, and violating privacy. Both human rights defenders and UN experts have expressed serious concern about the charges against her.
Ne Molchi’s accounts have also been frozen in relation to the criminal charges against Smailova, creating serious challenges for its operations. In a development raising further concern, in June 2025 Smailova reported suspicious surveillance, including the use of a drone outside her apartment in Montenegro, prompting local police to open an investigation.
No progress on accountability for journalist’s killing
There was no progress in ensuring accountability for those involved in the killing of opposition journalist and activist Aidos Sadykov in Kyiv, Ukraine. As reported before, Sadykov died in hospital on 2nd July 2024 after being critically shot and wounded when travelling by car with his wife on 18th June 2024. While Ukrainian authorities have declared two Kazakhstani citizens suspected of carrying out the attack internationally wanted and requested their detention, Kazakhstani authorities have declined to assist the investigation. One suspect was detained in Kazakhstan shortly after the attempt, allegedly when turning himself in. However, according to Sadykov’s widow, he was later released under a travel ban, while no active efforts appear to have been taken to locate the second suspect. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office has refused to share information about the case with media, citing non-disclosure of investigative details. As previously reported, Sadykov and his wife ran a popular YouTube channel critical of the Kazakhstani authorities and faced ongoing intimidation and harassment after fleeing the country in 2014, including criminal charges brought against them in absentia.
Fines for allegedly ‘’false’’ information
A criminal code provision (article 274) that penalises the intentional spread of ‘’false’’ information is frequently misused against government critics. In addition, a new administrative offence (article 456-2) introduced in 2023 to penalise sharing ‘’false’’ information – even unintentionally – has also repeatedly been used to punish legitimate free speech.
For example, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Azattyq has been fined twice under this provision. In November 2023, it was fined around 200 EUR over an article stating that the Collective Security Treaty Organisation is “led” by Russia. A year later, it was fined approximately 340 EUR because of a video report containing a translation mistake: the Kazakh-language report referred to a prosecutor request for an eight-year sentence for a journalist, while the Russian-language article on which this statement was based said that such a sentence ‘’threatened’’ the journalist. Radio Azattyq admitted the mistake and offered to correct it, stressing that there had been no intention to publish ‘’false’’ information. The court nevertheless convicted the service.
Another example of the misuse of this article is the case of Almaty City Council deputy Timur Eleusizov, who in January 2025 was fined about 150 EUR because of a video posted on Instagram in which he argued that the government’s programme was “aimed at destroying the Kazakh population”, referring in particular to problems in emergency assistance, health care and access to education. Although he argued he was expressing his opinion and that of others, the court found him guilty.
In yet another example, in early June 2025, an Astana court fined blogger Kirill Pavlov about 135 EUR for disseminating ‘’false’’ information after he questioned the Ministry of Agriculture’s data on an invasion of locusts – swarming insects that can destroy crops on a massive scale – in his Facebook posts. Pavlov said the court failed to explain why his information was supposedly false, only arguing that it differed from official data. This illustrates how any information that contradicts official claims is effectively treated as ‘’false’’.
IPHR, KIBHR
Обсуждение закрыто.